

## Framing Theory in Newspaper Coverage of the 2015 Greek Referendum

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### Abstract

*In 2015, the Greek prime minister announced a referendum on the country's proposed debt bailout. Media outlets shaped the referendum into "YES" and "NO" frames based on their political spectrum. A week after the referendum announcement, the Greek people overwhelmingly voted to oppose the creditors' measures. This study analyzed 14 articles each from two major Greek newspapers, Kathimerini and Ta Nea. The results showed that both papers portrayed the referendum along the frames of "YES" and "NO" referendum campaigns. Kathimerini used more frames than Ta Nea, but overall neither paper strictly adhered to their campaign's framing.*

### I. Introduction

In the early hours of June 27, 2015, Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister (PM), announced a national Panhellenic referendum after a breakdown in negotiations during a summit between Greece and its creditors. Scheduled and conducted a week from the day of the announcement, the referendum asked Greeks to vote on a package of measures from Greece's creditors. It immediately became a hotly contested point by both sides. Critics and supporters alike grew passionate in their debate, leading to polarization. The short time frame exasperated the situation, as did rampant misinformation about the EU, the unclear issue being voted upon, and the implementation of capital control measures. After a week heavy with rallies, demonstrations, speeches, and interviews, more than 6 million votes were cast on July 5 (Greek Ministry of the Interior, July 2015). In a move that stunned both national and international experts, polls, and politicians, Greece overwhelmingly voted in favor of "No," rejecting a package of measures proposed by Greece's lenders.

As a national referendum in a country ravaged by economic depression and lackluster growth, the stakes for the negotiations were at an all-time high. Considering this, it is not surprising that news outlets from both sides of the argument promoted specific agendas. Using framing theory, a qualitative analysis of the 14 days surrounding the referendum explained the ways that two newspapers from opposite sides of the Greek political spectrum presented the 2015 Greek referendum.

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## II. Theory

Framing theory was applied to examine how Greek newspapers showed bias in their news reporting on the referendum. According to the theory, media select “some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text” (Entman, 1993, p. 52), presenting stories and narratives a certain way. This allowed the suppliers of a message to stress one or more elements of the story to influence public reception. News media, in particular, have been shown to follow a narrative through its coverage, stemming from socio-political leanings and agenda (DeVreese et al., 2011).

The importance of framing theory lies in media’s potency to influence the audience by creating the frames that shape the referendum’s coverage. A 1997 study examined the effect of different news frames in how participants felt about the Ku Klux Klan’s right to protest (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). Their findings showed that even a subject with a certain level of notoriety can elicit support from participants if presented a certain way as to highlight relatable or understandable issues. It’s notable due to the strength and permanence of the initial reception. Sloman and Fernbach (2017) examined the incredible power of baseless notions to be considered as fact once first accepted. They explain that “as a rule, strong feelings about issues do not emerge from deep understanding” (p. 172). After an audience has first formed an opinion for a story, it entrenches itself, rejecting later information, even if factual or presented by experts, that contradicts the present belief. Because of this, once a frame has been used by a newspaper, it is hard for the audience to distance itself from it, especially so if the subject was previously unaware of the reported issue.

In the case of the 2015 Greek referendum, understanding the framing power of news is pivotal to understanding the public’s decision to vote. This is due to the suddenness of the referendum. As previously mentioned, people without a basis of knowledge tend to be more susceptible to ideological entrenchment after being presented with an issue. Because the referendum was a surprising announcement by the PM, Greeks did not have a pre-existing perception of the issue. This sudden and unexpected advent of a referendum allowed these newspapers to frame the issue to a much greater extent. Framing theory explains “how messages, based on certain patterns of emphasis and exclusion, can structure the thinking of the people who encounter them” (McLeod & Shah, 2015, p. 11).

## III. Background

### ***Greece between 2009-2015***

To understand the factors that led to the 2015 referendum in Greece and why the news media framed it a certain way, readers need to have background information for Greece’s history since the economic recession of 2008. Two years after reelection, the then-PM Konstantinos Karamanlis of the New Democracy party (ND) called for emergency elections in 2009, partly to strengthen his authority in the Greek Parliament, and partly to exhibit popular confidence in the face of the looming recession. During the campaign, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement party, PASOK, found great popularity after its leader, George Papandreou, began using the slogan “Money Exists” (Nedos, 2014). Utilizing a positive message that implied the need for no changes, PASOK emerged victorious with more than 3 million votes in 2009 (Greek Ministry of the Interior, 2009) from the campaign, gaining autonomy to govern in parliament (*Kathimerini*, 2009), even though its Papandreou’s government soon collapsed in 2012 (Greek Ministry of the Interior, 2012).

Papandreou’s government revealed the nation’s disastrous financial situation, highlighting its mishandling of the crisis, which led to rampant unemployment and the growth of Greece’s national debt. Since the election, the PASOK party appeared feckless and weak, bowing to creditors’ demands and burdening Greece’s economy, which saw a steady and steep decline. The creditors, made up of the so-called troika—the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—pushed their measures and negotiations, which came to be seen in Greece as draconian. Papanderou’s inability to curb their influence, combined with fears he was leading the country toward a Grexit, a scenario in which Greece might exit the European Union (EU), forced him to step down as party chairman and call elections (Papadiochou, 2011).

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In the ensuing campaign, ND won the election, while the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza), the outspoken critic of the PASOK administration, came in second. ND was soon painted by Syriza as the “old guard,” equally weak to PASOK. Antonis Samaras, the new PM, sought to govern conservatively, slowly growing the economy and working with the lenders in restoring the Greek economy. Despite notable economic recovery (Nika, 2016), Syriza managed to sway public opinion, and defeat ND in September 2015, taking control of the government (Greek Ministry of the Interior, January 2015).

### ***Greek Referendum***

Having risen to power, the Syriza party, a harsh critic of the EU and Greece’s lenders, began to govern for the first time since its inception. The party was not, however, greeted warmly in European circles, having been responsible for numerous incendiary comments toward them. Alexis Tsipras, the new PM, began negotiations for new bailout measures. Despite popular pressure to bring about a swift resolution to the negotiations, the EU economic summits were continuously extended into the summer. Giannis Varoufakis, minister of the economy, sought to drive the EU and Greece’s lenders into a deal where they would give Greece favorable terms or risk a Grexit. The tensions mounted through June, with no agreement in sight. With both sides locked in a battle for economic control over Greece, and the window for any agreement closing (Varvitsioti & Antoniou, 2015), Tsipras decided on June 27 to put up the most recent results of the negotiation to a national referendum.

The referendum was about whether Greece was to accept the bailout conditions of the Troika. The “YES” vote, which proponents claimed would show a Greece committed to the European ideals, willing to make changes and take hard decisions; “NO,” which supporters interpreted as a strong show of Greek sovereignty and autonomy, would demand the freedom of self-determination for Greece to handle its own crisis without imposed austerity measures. Many outside Greece saw this move toward a referendum as putting too much faith in the ability of “average citizens” to decide the fate of their country, while the government felt it was a decision too important to take without the express command of the Greek people (Varoufakis, 2015). Opposition to the referendum further contended that Syriza had been elected only five months prior, and that it should decide for itself, while proponents claimed it showed true democratic spirit to hold such a referendum (Kallitsis, 2015). Immediately the campaigns for the referendum took form.

After a week of intense campaigning from both sides, during which Greece defaulted, the banks enacted Capital Controls (still active in 2017), polling predicted a very narrow win for the “NO” faction (*Kathimerini*, 07-03-2015). This prediction was quite different from the result, where the “NO” camp claimed an overwhelming victory, emerging victorious in every county in Greece (Greek Ministry of the Interior, July 2015). Having received a strong popular showing against the bailout measures, Tsipras returned to the negotiations, which had turned hostile. He was met with derision, a result of the incendiary way the “NO” campaign had framed Europe and the Troika. To complicate matters, either the Greek or European side had no consensus on what the result of the referendum meant, as the referendum packet voted upon had been outdated days prior to the vote, as the summit was still ongoing. These factors—and Tsipras’ rising desperation in the face of Greece’s default—led to measures much harsher than the ones the referendum rejected as too extensive. Popular opinion of Tsipras and Syriza soured, as they seemed to have grossly mishandled the situation. In response, Tsipras called elections in September, which Syriza won once more (Greek Ministry of the Interior, September 2015).

## **IV. Literature Review**

Understanding the ways that media frame political issues is an important part of consuming media. This literature review focused on three sections. The first examined referendums in other countries through an interdisciplinary lens. The second detailed how media in other countries have framed notable political events. Following that, the frames that Greek newspapers used were examined, allowing for a more nuanced and complete approach to studying Greek newspaper frames employed in the 2015 referendum.

The study of referendums in countries beside Greece allows for an overview of how referendums are employed, what they test, and how they’re decided. Referendums can be employed to show societal desires. Clarke et al. argue in a 2004 study of the 1995 Quebec referendum in Canada that the referendum is employed as a sign of direct democracy. The government used the referendum to end the Quebec question,

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leaving it up to the citizens of the province to decide the matter for themselves (Clarke et al., 2004). What a referendum does is to provide political cover to both sides of the voted-upon matter: people of a country establish their own desires, and thus can't shift blame easily.

A similar case where a referendum was used to defuse blame or refrain from taking difficult political decisions can be seen in Sweden's employment of referendums. In his discussion of the Swedish system, Ruin (1996) said the following: "The political parties were all involved . . . in the five referendum campaigns, even though they never took prime responsibility for . . . them" (p. 179). According to Ruin, each referendum was used to smooth over internal disputes, settling the matter before the intra-party internal divisions could become too extensive.

A referendum can also be understood as a test of the people's faith in their government. In a 1995 article discussing the 1992 Maastricht treaty, the researchers proposed that rather than a sign of agreement or disagreement with an issue, referendums may be a show of support and trust in government (Franklin et al., 1995). The study found that both France and Denmark had unpopular governments in 1992, leading to an increased distrust of the federal Eurocentric policy. Thus, referendum results, to some extent, are decided by the people's faith in their elected officials, in addition to one's opinion on the question put forth. At the very least, it influences the perception of the pro- and anti-government positions.

These cases show intriguing parallels to Greece. In Quebec, the researchers claim that the referendum failed because it was presented as "ill-defined and unsubstantiated" with "visions of alternative political futures" (Clarke et al., 2004, p. 346). The same tension existed in Greece, where neither side (both within and outside of Greece) could agree on the exact goal of the referendum. Additionally, Syriza was accused by members of the opposition of lacking the political courage to settle the matter themselves. Considering the similar tactic from Sweden, some credence must be afforded to that theory. Furthermore, the "trust in government" approach can be used to explain the result in Greece: While both parties were unpopular, the Syriza government was considerably more popular than the ND party.

In their study of the 1992 Canadian referendum of Quebec, LeDuc and Pammett (1995), claimed that the outcome of any referendum "is even more dependent on the short-term elements of the campaign" than in elections (p. 5). This was tested by a 1999 study, which held that despite popular belief in the dramatic increase of the "Yes" campaign (which wanted to break away from Canada), a meta-analysis of polls supports a slow and gradual increase in support (Fox et al., 1999). This idea holds true for the Greek referendum as well.

Many other studies have expanded the field of political media framing. One study into the 2015 Greek referendum examined Google search analytics to predict the election. Askitas (2015) argued that people became increasingly entrenched in their beliefs over the course of the referendum, searching online for their own opinion to validate it or better understand it. This study found that the "NO" vote, which was in the majority prior to the vote itself, had grown exponentially after June 30, the day the Troika drew a line in the sand. This presents a frame of Brave Nationalism. Simply put, Syriza presented the referendum as a declaration of courage and pride in Greece. The voters were essentially asked to accept a risky gamble to prove their national pride.

Unlike Askitas' research, which relied on data from the population in question, Lundblad (2016) examined the framing of the media. In her research on the Brexit campaign, she saw an overabundance of Euroscepticism frames in the British media. She elaborates on this claim: "The most frequent media framing has presented a negative picture of the EU" (p. 13). She further explained that some papers that supported the "remain" vote didn't promote the EU as a positive, but as a lesser of two evils. Looking at the number of sales in addition to the political leanings of papers, she contends that sales-wise, the negative perception of the EU outsold the positive to the tune of 80% to 20%. Seen in this way, the Brexit referendum seems one-sided, at least regarding the value of the EU. On the same topic, Brueggemann (2016) proposes that Brexit newspaper coverage led to some voter disaffection with news portrayals of topics. According to his research, the overabundance of conflicting messages resulted in considerably reducing the significance of policy points and expert opinions. He notes that "a large group of (well-educated) voters . . . draw their vote based on both their personal attitude towards the EU as well as things that they perceived as affecting them directly" (p. 23). His point, when taken together with Lundblad's, presents the possibility that one of two identified factors that will influence the referendum vote could have been monopolized by the "Leave" campaign's frame of Euroscepticism.

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It should be noted that there are some notable differences between Brexit and the Greek referendums, despite the seeming similarities one may draw between them. For one, the populace did not have significant time to prepare for the idea of a referendum, nor come to grips with its effects either way. Also, there was great confusion over what a “YES” or “NO” vote meant, to the point where even after the vote, people were still confused both inside and outside Greece. In addition, it should be noted that the Greek economy suffered a default during the lead-up to the referendum, causing tensions to escalate further, and adding a “ticking-clock” element to the referendum entirely absent from the Brexit vote. For these reasons, Brexit studies must be separated from the Greek situation, and the frames must change as well.

Based on the review of referendum studies and media framing studies, it is possible to identify frames that Greek newspapers may have used in their referendum coverage. Based on their public policies and stance toward the EU, the “NO” campaigns frames are as follows: sovereignty, economic freedom, and brave nationalism. The sovereignty frame was used to describe the referendum as a question of regaining control over the country’s decision-making ability. As discussed earlier, this was a point with which Syriza gained power, by delegitimizing the parties of PASOK and ND as European cronies or puppets. The economic freedom frame helped establish this as a matter of interest to the economically–desperate Greeks, framing the question of the referendum as one of forced, and close-minded austerity, versus willing and forward-thinking economic reform. The final frame used by the “NO” campaign was brave nationalism, through which the referendum was framed as a matter of national pride. As explained previously, the decision was presented as a matter of national pride, a risk worth taking to prove one’s faith in the country.

The “YES” campaign used different frames: European identity, political cowardice, and incompetence. The campaign to accept the bailout measures was framed as affirming their **European identity**, as voting in favor of the EU’s proposal became a symbol of pro-Europe sentiment and trust in the Troika institutions. By extension, this framed the “NO” campaign as anti-Europe, declaring it as opposed to European ideals and standards. A second frame was **political cowardice**, framing the referendum as the act of a political party desperate to escape the burden of tough decisions while in power by passing blame for its contrary positions to the voters themselves. A third frame employed was **incompetence**. Syriza, the referendum, and the “NO” movement were framed by the “YES” camp as having failed in their elected mission, the negotiations with the creditors, and their governance. The research also explored the ways the two chosen newspapers, one right-leaning and one left-leaning, employed the above frames in setting their agenda and promoting their message.

## V. Methods

This research paper examined two Greek newspapers from opposite sides of the Greek political spectrum. One article each day between June 24 and July 8, except for July 5, was chosen from each of two newspapers based on its most prominent placement on the front page. One of the two papers, *Kathimerini* prints daily, while another paper, *Ta Nea*, lacks a Sunday edition. The latter’s sister paper, *Ta Nea*, *To Vima*, publishes a Sunday edition and it was included for analysis instead.

The two papers were chosen for three reasons: availability, popularity, and socio-political standing. First, both newspapers are daily and have extensive archives of their previous publications available online. The original articles from 2015 were available for research purposes. Secondly, these papers have robust circulations and were heavily relied upon in the two-week period of this study (News247, 2015). Finally, the papers reside on opposite sides of the Greek political spectrum. *Kathimerini* (Καθημερινή) is a center-right newspaper, whereas *Ta Nea* (Τα Νέα) is a center-left paper. Additionally, they are widely considered the least partisan of Greek newspapers, serving as prime examples of fact-based reporting and “accepted” journalistic practices. Because these articles are written in Greek, all the findings were translated into English, including their titles and author names.

This study examined how the three frames each come into play even in newspapers taking a semi-neutral stance on reporting the news. *Kathimerini* articles were coded for the three frames of European identity, political cowardice, and incompetence (for), while *Ta Nea* (along with *To Vima*) for sovereignty, economic freedom, and brave nationalism (for) (Refer to Table 1).

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**Table 1: Coding sheets for content analysis**

<b>Frame Coding Form</b>			
<b>Newspaper</b>	<b>Frame</b>	<b>Key Concept(s)</b>	<b>Key Concept(s) in Greek</b>
<i>Kathimerini</i>	<b>European Identity</b>	Europe as friend, Greece as part of Europe	Ευρώπη ως φίλη, Ελλάδα ως μέλος της Ευρώπης
	<b>Political Cowardice</b>	Reflecting blame, Avoiding decisions	Προσάπτει ευθύνη, Αποφεύγει αποφάσεις
	<b>Incompetence</b>	Horrible negotiations, Government incompetence	Αισχρή διαπραγμάτευση, Κυβερνητική ανικανότητα
<i>Ta Nea &amp; To Vima</i>	Sovereignty	Tyranny, Autonomy	Τυραννία, Αυτονομία
	Economic Freedom	European Control, European Measures	Ευρωπαϊκός έλεγχος, Ευρωπαϊκά μέτρα
	Brave Nationalism	Brave decision, “Prove something...”	Θαρραλέα απόφαση, «Να αποδείξουμε...»

## VI. Results

### *Coverage of “Yes” campaign by Kathimerini*

*Kathimerini* articles were examined to see whether they could have used one of the three frames. The total number of articles that could have been recorded under the category of “Potential count.” When these potential articles adopted the corresponding frame, their number was recorded under the column of “Realized count” (Refer to Table 2). The category of realized count was made to exclude articles from the count when their stories had nothing to do with the frame categories.

**Table 2: Use of “YES” frames in *Kathimerini* articles**

<b>Frame</b>	<b>Potential count</b>	<b>Realized count</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>European Identity</b>	13	7	54%
<b>Political Cowardice</b>	13	6	46%
<b>Incompetence</b>	13	11	85%

The European identity frame was a factor in all but one article, yet only seven employed the frame. The most notable example was the centerpiece article from June 28, which boldly declared that Greece is European and it cannot be seriously contemplated as outside the EU (*Kathimerini*, 06-28-2015). Noteworthy is that this frame became an issue the moment the referendum came up. As shown in *Figure 1*, prior to June 28, the idea of an inherent European identity that Greece belonged to was ignored. *Kathimerini* employed the frame only when Greece was threatened with being taken away.




Figure 1: Employment of European Identity Frame by *Kathimerini*

The political cowardice frame could be a factor in 13 articles, but only 6 employed it. In fact, the most notable example was the centerpiece article from June 28, which boldly declared that Greece is European and it cannot be seriously contemplated as outside the EU (*Kathimerini*, 06-28-2015). What's surprising is the number of times this frame was employed in the most prominent front-page stories before and after the July 5 referendum. As shown in *Figure 2*, *Kathimerini* stayed away from this frame between June 25, when the referendum was announced, and when it ended with votes on the referendum. Shockingly, apart from the poignant dismissal of the referendum as the act of a coward when it was first announced, the newspaper left the frame alone during the referendum discussion proper.



Figure 2: Employment of political cowardice frame by *Kathimerini*

The newspaper used the incompetence frame most often, in 11 articles. The frame was often evident multiple times in each article. The newspaper seemed to place significant value on framing the PM and his government as incompetent, often restating their negotiation and political mistakes. The most prominent example branded the government as incompetent 40 times in an article of fewer than 900 words (Jacobidis, 2015).

The content analysis showed that *Kathimerini* certainly engaged with the same frames as the “YES” campaign, but only one frame was heavily used. One article from the front-page stories stood out from the rest and deserves mention. A July 1 article stands out because even though it contains a story where each of the three frames could have been used, it is devoid of them (Antoniou, 07-01-2015). What makes this more bizarre is that it concerns problems in the Tsipras government, with internal squabbles threatening the stability of the Syriza party itself. Yet despite this, it is not framed as a matter of cowardice on the part of Tsipras or the party, nor is it depicted as a result or example of incompetence in party cohesion or governance.

### **Coverage of the “NO” Campaign supported by *Ta Nea* (and *To Vima*)**

The “NO” Campaign supported by *Ta Nea* (and *To Vima*) was examined with respect to the three frames of sovereignty, economic freedom, and brave nationalism. The sovereignty frame could have been a factor in 12 articles, but only 6 articles used it (Refer to Table 3). Articles that discussed the effect of the referendum on citizens lacked this frame (Chrisolaura, 07-01-2015), whereas stories about the interaction between the EU and Greece mostly used this frame (Kexagia, 07-06-2015). It seems that *Ta Nea* found the frame of Greece without power when it covered the tangible concerns of people’s survival.

**Table 3: Use of NO frames in *Ta Nea* & *To Vima* articles**

Frame	Articles where applicable	Coding	Percentage
<b>Sovereignty</b>	12	6	50%
<b>Economic Freedom</b>	12	7	58%
<b>Brave Nationalism</b>	13	4	31%

The economic freedom frame was slightly more prominent: it appeared in 7 of the 12 articles in which the frame could have been used. This frame, unlike the sovereignty one, seemed to be decided by whether the content focused on the freedom to control one’s own economy and the results of that freedom. When the articles presented the referendum as having disastrous results, this frame was employed to show that the problem exists due to the Troika (Kexagia, 07-24-2015). There was a clear hint of Euroscepticism embedded in these articles, but the paper didn’t overuse the frame, nor employed it as a catch-all answer to legitimate woes of the citizens (Chrisolaura, 07-02-2015).

The brave nationalism frame was adopted by four articles of 13 that could have employed it. The timing of the four articles also coincided with moments of jubilation and success when the Greek government forced the Troika’s hand, or put itself in a difficult position. Evidently, it was used when the situation was legitimately patriotic (Karageorgiou, 2015). It is no coincidence that this frame was employed twice by *Ta Nea*, but *Kathimerini* did not use the incompetence frame to describe Tsipras and his government.

The content analysis showed that *Ta Nea*, along with *To Vima*, engaged with the “NO” campaign frames, but sparingly. With none of the frames used by more than 60% of the articles reviewed, this newspaper did not truly engage with these frames. In addition, this paper had more non-framed articles than *Kathimerini*. In fact, the newspaper did not have any of the “NO” campaign’s frames during the five days in this referendum period. Furthermore, it’s notable that this newspaper stepped away from the referendum on its front page twice, focusing instead on the effects of the capital controls in Greece rather than addressing “YES” or “NO” issues (Chrisolaura, 2015).



## VII. Discussion

The ways that the newspapers *Kathimerini* and *Ta Nea* used frames to present a message regarding the “YES” and “NO” referendum campaigns showed that the papers did not always adopt the frames expected. While *Kathimerini* had a much greater affinity for the “YES” frames than its counterpoint in this study, it did not exclusively rely on them in framing its message during the research period. *Kathimerini* also had a few oddities in its stories. Its peculiar usage of the European identity frame points to the way the editors of the paper perceived it: It was considered a given until challenged. Then it was defended against those who denied it. It seems that despite the newspaper’s labeling of Tsipras as a political coward afraid to take the hard decisions he was elected to, *Kathimerini* respected his conviction in the referendum. At the very least, his conviction was recognized. If there’s one frame of the “YES” campaign that *Kathimerini* whole-heartedly employed in its coverage of the referendum, it was the incompetent frame, somewhat understandable given the paper’s opposite political leanings to the government’s. But it didn’t stoop to making fun of an already weakened ideological opposite.

On the other side, *Ta Nea* held back much more in using frames to set the agenda of its news articles. While two of the frames were employed half the time, this publisher had significantly more newspapers’ front-page stories without any “NO” campaign frames. In fact, in framing its message during the research period, *Ta Nea* had a considerably lower use of frames than did *Kathimerini*. Of the two papers, it was more willing to look beyond the referendum story as a most prominent front-page story, to highlight the problems that Greek society was facing because of the referendum and the capital controls that ensued. During multiple days, it went without any of the three referendum-related frames.

## VII. Conclusion

By conducting a content analysis of 14 articles from each of two major Greek newspapers, the current author could discover the ways that they framed coverage of the 2015 Greek referendum. Both newspapers aligned roughly by their political leaning, with the right-leaning *Kathimerini* framing issues in the same fashion as the “YES” vote, and the left-leaning *Ta Nea* (and *To Vima*) employed the “NO” campaign’s frames. *Kathimerini* employed frames to promote their agenda more often than *Ta Nea*, but in comparison, the two newspapers didn’t exceedingly use any frame, apart from *Kathimerini*’s incompetence frame, which already aligned with its right-leaning anti-government agenda.

This study has some notable limitations. There was no second coder, who would have increased the validity of this study. Furthermore, the coding focused on three frames, which excluded other frames in articles if there were. Instead of many articles in the entire paper, the author selected only one article from each day. In addition, each newspaper’s articles could have been coded for both “YES” and “NO” campaign frames.

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